Let us say that all perspectives, by some stretch of relation,
belong to the same world, the same 'Venn-like compilation.'
Now it is a matter of whether one concept absolutely blocks out
the existence of another. Some concepts will belong in the same
world, some concepts will be fictions, some concepts will be
blocked out, and some concepts will be treated as imaginary, but
will not be blocked out, much like Alexius Meinong's concept of a
pile of money that never existed.

Now, we can picture that each such concept in the world exists for
some reason, because of some purpose, but each purpose may be
somewhat obscure. Some purposes are obvious and explicable,
and need no further purpose. Some purposes are complex enough
to be explicable but not obvious, like calculus or a butterfly effect.
Other purposes are neither obvious nor explicable, and some are
obviously inexplicable, like an intentionally-confusing haiku.

Depending on what it is, a thing may belong to any permutation of
those two sets. For example, a haiku may be obscure, but
understandable in our world because of the perverse psychology
of the haikuist. Many concepts are explained by psychology or
the lack thereof. In another case, some aspects of the world may
exist because someone doesn't realize that  they are perversely
inspired ideas, like trees and buildings that are convenient for
ninjas to climb. Thus, the world is composed of mere inspirations,
mere objects, but also perversely-inspired objects, and objects
which have meaningful purposes originating in some or another
context of reality and psychology. Life is fundamentally both
psychological and intellectual, and the true, original functionality
of the world is in defiance of both ideas.