At some point in examining the tables of categories, one might
observe a singular problem: the problem of simultaneous
differences, or in other words, paradoxical naive realism.

As an example, consider that on the one hand we have:

"Knowing of Pain"

This can be translated to mean essentially that pain is bad, and
perhaps the desire for pleasure or something more meaningful or
substantial than pain, such as Meaning or The Ultimate.

On the other hand, what if pain gives life reality, and when pain is
missing, we miss the Real Dimension of life? In that case, we get
a second concept, which is:

"Knowing FROM Pain"

However, the two concepts are incompatible, because they arise
for vastly different reasons. In the first case ("of"), pain arises in
excessive proportions, whereas in the second case ("from"), pain
arises as a special signifier of reality that once existed.

One can observe this difference for example in the 'hostage
syndrome' and Pavlov's dogs.

How does this show that irrationality is a system? Well, if we take
the case as exemplary of the most objective emotions, that is,
those that are purely symbolic and may be given or taken, this
serves to exemplify at least one degree of universal irrationality.

This is supported by the understanding that conventional
definitions of pleasure and pain are suited to naive realism or else
objective knowledge----that is, relativism or else prescriptivism.

So far as irrationality is concerned, categorical knowlege is
similar to naive realism: both accept either a category or a
relation of categories as the basis for knowledge. But irrationality
rejects the obviousness of categories and also relations of
categories. It has a less obvious structure.

Let me elaborate what I know from the 'FROM' relationship.

1. Irrationality can be a vector.

2. The vector can carry further content, which may or may not be

3. The irrational treats rational and irrational content the same

4. The irrationality of the vector is conserved.

Thus, in simple terms, irrationality involves adding the
qualification that something is 'irrational'. At first, one might
suppose that either irrationality is a rational assessment of an
irrational condition, whose vector is judgment, or irrationality is
an irrational assessment of a condition which cannot be deemed
rational because of a lack of judgment.

However, irrational judgments may be possible, and this is the
only real way to qualify irrationality for logic. If what we mean by
judgment is a lack of standards, then there is no formal irrational
logic. So, what we mean by irrational logic entails irrational
standards or an irrational context.

The best way to guarantee irrational logic at this point is to grant
that an irrational context provides a means for granting irrational
standards. But at this point, irrationality is no different from
categorical logic in that respect. And, it seems to simply involve a
'freer' form of rationality, that is, one without limits on its
standards. But, nonetheless, there appears to be a limit,
conceptually. For it may be determined that irrationality must
have a context or a vector of irrationality.

If there were no vector, then a context would be required, much
as a lack of deductive argument implies empiricism.

Thus, there may be four types of irrational arguments:

1. Vector

This is simply a qualifier that something is irrational. It may or
may not be proven that the thing actually is irrational. In other
words, it is conditional. What is irrational is that it is unknown
whether the thing is, could be, or under some definition is,
irrational. This is also called relative irrationality. If everything
were irrational, the concept of nothing would be relatively
rational. At this point what is irrational is that rationality has a
standard. However, it is still possible for irrationality to meet the
standard of reasonableness, through paradox.

2. Context

This is also called qualified irrationality. It is the check against
total irrationality. It is something that seems irrational even if it
isn't. It is irrational under some definition. Systems of this type
might include naive realism, paradoxes, or incoherency. Problems
are created to solve, so it is neither irrational nor rational. But it
is not yet meaningless. It has semantic content in a condition of
suspense. Rational numbers for example, might be fancifully
irrational in this way, because they can be multiplied by

3. Double-negation

This type produces meaninglessness. It is a form of existential
failure. It may involve making demands on reason. It might exist
this way under absolute definitions. This amounts to complexity
exclusively, across the board, thus leading to universal
irrationality. It may remain irrational after it is defined (for
example, the notorious undefined functions).

4. Excessive rationality

Concepts, in particular like (A) Stupidity*, (B) Over-complexity,
(C) Genius, and (D) Under-complexity have this type of
character. They are more complex than they appear at first, at
least if viewed as forms of irrationality. This is explained by an
imbalance between the tools used to perceive and the perception
itself. Irrational semantics is created, which in turn provides a
basis for infinite irrationality as an extension of reason.

*The concept of stupidity is similar to contingency, in that
alternate systems can be swapped in without regard for rules. The
rule tends to be that stupidity is in proportion to genius, but not
vice versa. In other words, genius borrows from stupidity or it
doesn't, and otherwise it's about complexity. These types of
correlations become a relatively solid basis for general concepts
of irrationality.