FORMAL / LOGICAL SYSTEMS IRRATIONAL LOGIC At some point in examining the tables of categories, one might observe a singular problem: the problem of simultaneous differences, or in other words, paradoxical naive realism. As an example, consider that on the one hand we have: "Knowing of Pain" This can be translated to mean essentially that pain is bad, and perhaps the desire for pleasure or something more meaningful or substantial than pain, such as Meaning or The Ultimate. On the other hand, what if pain gives life reality, and when pain is missing, we miss the Real Dimension of life? In that case, we get a second concept, which is: "Knowing FROM Pain" However, the two concepts are incompatible, because they arise for vastly different reasons. In the first case ("of"), pain arises in excessive proportions, whereas in the second case ("from"), pain arises as a special signifier of reality that once existed. One can observe this difference for example in the 'hostage syndrome' and Pavlov's dogs. How does this show that irrationality is a system? Well, if we take the case as exemplary of the most objective emotions, that is, those that are purely symbolic and may be given or taken, this serves to exemplify at least one degree of universal irrationality. This is supported by the understanding that conventional definitions of pleasure and pain are suited to naive realism or else objective knowledge----that is, relativism or else prescriptivism. So far as irrationality is concerned, categorical knowlege is similar to naive realism: both accept either a category or a relation of categories as the basis for knowledge. But irrationality rejects the obviousness of categories and also relations of categories. It has a less obvious structure. Let me elaborate what I know from the 'FROM' relationship. 1. Irrationality can be a vector. 2. The vector can carry further content, which may or may not be irrational. 3. The irrational treats rational and irrational content the same way. 4. The irrationality of the vector is conserved. Thus, in simple terms, irrationality involves adding the qualification that something is 'irrational'. At first, one might suppose that either irrationality is a rational assessment of an irrational condition, whose vector is judgment, or irrationality is an irrational assessment of a condition which cannot be deemed rational because of a lack of judgment. However, irrational judgments may be possible, and this is the only real way to qualify irrationality for logic. If what we mean by judgment is a lack of standards, then there is no formal irrational logic. So, what we mean by irrational logic entails irrational standards or an irrational context. The best way to guarantee irrational logic at this point is to grant that an irrational context provides a means for granting irrational standards. But at this point, irrationality is no different from categorical logic in that respect. And, it seems to simply involve a 'freer' form of rationality, that is, one without limits on its standards. But, nonetheless, there appears to be a limit, conceptually. For it may be determined that irrationality must have a context or a vector of irrationality. If there were no vector, then a context would be required, much as a lack of deductive argument implies empiricism. Thus, there may be four types of irrational arguments: 1. Vector This is simply a qualifier that something is irrational. It may or may not be proven that the thing actually is irrational. In other words, it is conditional. What is irrational is that it is unknown whether the thing is, could be, or under some definition is, irrational. This is also called relative irrationality. If everything were irrational, the concept of nothing would be relatively rational. At this point what is irrational is that rationality has a standard. However, it is still possible for irrationality to meet the standard of reasonableness, through paradox. 2. Context This is also called qualified irrationality. It is the check against total irrationality. It is something that seems irrational even if it isn't. It is irrational under some definition. Systems of this type might include naive realism, paradoxes, or incoherency. Problems are created to solve, so it is neither irrational nor rational. But it is not yet meaningless. It has semantic content in a condition of suspense. Rational numbers for example, might be fancifully irrational in this way, because they can be multiplied by i. 3. Double-negation This type produces meaninglessness. It is a form of existential failure. It may involve making demands on reason. It might exist this way under absolute definitions. This amounts to complexity exclusively, across the board, thus leading to universal irrationality. It may remain irrational after it is defined (for example, the notorious undefined functions). 4. Excessive rationality Concepts, in particular like (A) Stupidity*, (B) Over-complexity, (C) Genius, and (D) Under-complexity have this type of character. They are more complex than they appear at first, at least if viewed as forms of irrationality. This is explained by an imbalance between the tools used to perceive and the perception itself. Irrational semantics is created, which in turn provides a basis for infinite irrationality as an extension of reason. *The concept of stupidity is similar to contingency, in that alternate systems can be swapped in without regard for rules. The rule tends to be that stupidity is in proportion to genius, but not vice versa. In other words, genius borrows from stupidity or it doesn't, and otherwise it's about complexity. These types of correlations become a relatively solid basis for general concepts of irrationality.          BACK TO SYSTEMS